On March 20, 2025, the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO), France’s Parquet National Financier (PNF) and the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG) announced the formation of the International Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Taskforce (Taskforce) to strengthen collaboration in the fight against bribery and corruption. This announcement came just over a month after U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order “pausing” criminal enforcement of the FCPA (FCPA EO), following which several DOJ investigations and cases have been delayed, dismissed or closed.
In the Taskforce’s founding statement, the agencies note the significant threat of bribery and corruption and the severe harm it causes, and they offer a full-throated reaffirmation of their commitment to tackle this threat within both national and international legal frameworks. They stress that success relies on working closely and effectively together and building further on the strong existing relationships, and they say that they intend to invite other like-minded agencies to participate in the Taskforce.
This clear divergence between the signals and statements of some of the world’s most significant anti-corruption enforcement agencies leaves companies, individuals and counsel to wonder what such enforcement will look like in the months and years to come. Early signs suggest the U.S. will indeed retreat to a noticeable degree from criminal anti-corruption enforcement and, in this article, we discuss how the FCPA EO may open up space for other enforcement authorities, such as the new Taskforce, to step into the void.
For insights from the SFO, PNF and OAG, see “2024 in Review: International Cooperation Continues to Drive ABAC Enforcement” (Dec. 18, 2024).
The State of U.S. Enforcement
The change in the U.S. presidential administration has led to some significant changes in anti-corruption enforcement from both the DOJ and SEC.
FCPA EO
The FCPA EO asserts that the FCPA “has been systematically, and to a steadily increasing degree, stretched beyond proper bounds and abused in a manner that harms the interests of the United States,” and instructs the DOJ not to open any new FCPA investigations or engage in any “FCPA enforcement” for 180 days, unless the AG makes “an individual exception” for a particular matter, based on as-yet-unclear criteria.
During this 180‑day period (which the AG can extend for a further 180 days), the AG is instructed by the FCPA EO to conduct a review of all existing investigations, enforcement actions, policies and guidelines related to the FCPA. The AG is further instructed to “issue updated guidelines or policies” related to FCPA investigations and enforcement actions, and thereafter to “determine whether additional actions, including remedial measures with respect to inappropriate past FCPA investigations and enforcement actions, are warranted.” Like the criteria for making “individual exceptions” to the “pause,” the criteria by which past FCPA investigations or enforcement actions might be deemed “inappropriate” are not articulated in the FCPA EO and have not since been announced by the DOJ.
Finally, in a significant departure from historical practice, the FCPA EO directs that all FCPA investigations and enforcement actions “initiated or continued” after the AG issues new guidance must “be specifically authorized” by the AG.
Bondi Memo
On her first day at the DOJ, and just five days before President Trump issued the FCPA EO, newly appointed AG Pam Bondi issued a memo to DOJ employees titled “Total Elimination of Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations” (Bondi Memo), in which she directed that the DOJ Criminal Division’s FCPA Unit prioritize investigations related to cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). For any such investigations, the memo also suspended DOJ policies requiring authorization by and participation of the DOJ’s Criminal Division in FCPA matters.
While the FCPA EO’s “pause” rendered this requirement largely moot, many observers expect that any “updated guidelines or policies” issued by the AG pursuant to the FCPA EO will incorporate similar requirements.
Some Cases Abandoned, Others Continue
The ultimate impact of the FCPA EO on existing and prior DOJ investigations and prosecutions remains unclear, but early signs indicate that it will not lead to a complete discontinuation of DOJ FCPA enforcement.
For example, although a high-profile FCPA trial in the District of New Jersey was delayed and ultimately dismissed at the request of the newly installed U.S. Attorney for that district, and several ongoing FCPA investigations reportedly have been closed by the DOJ in recent weeks, at least three other FCPA trials, including two in the Southern District of Florida, reportedly have been exempted from the “pause” and are expected to occur in the coming months.
That said, the DOJ reportedly sent no representatives to the March 2025 meeting of the OECD Working Group on Bribery, an important multilateral event in which the U.S. historically has played a leading role. The U.S.’ absence, which came a month after several former Working Group on Bribery officials attempted to convince the AG of the value of participation via letter, sent an unmistakable signal to the U.S.’ anti-corruption enforcement partners and the rest of the world about what they might expect from the U.S. in the remaining years of the Trump administration.
Is Bribery “Back in Business?”
Unsurprisingly, the FCPA EO has fueled speculation that a decline in anti-corruption enforcement will lead to a proliferation of unethical business practices. Members of the press have queried whether bribery is “back in business,” and the executive director of Transparency International U.S. stated in a social media post that the FCPA EO “diminishes - and could pave the way for completely eliminating - the crown jewel in the U.S.’ fight against global corruption.” However, companies should hesitate before rolling back anti-corruption compliance measures, for several reasons.
The FCPA EO Doesn’t Shut Down FCPA Enforcement
The FCPA EO does not amend the FCPA; that can only be done by the U.S. Congress. And while it unquestionably was designed for maximum publicity impact, the FCPA EO is limited in scope – it only pauses certain DOJ FCPA enforcement activities, leaving unaffected the investigative and enforcement activities of the SEC, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and foreign enforcement authorities, and at least one U.S. state – California – has suggested it will continue to hold accountable those who engage in bribery and corruption. Moreover, the DOJ has already demonstrated that, despite the “pause,” certain FCPA investigations and prosecutions will proceed, and after the expiration of the “pause,” the DOJ may well ratchet up FCPA enforcement that aligns with the priorities articulated in the Bondi Memo and elsewhere.
The FCPA EO May Be (Relatively) Short-Lived
FCPA violations generally are subject to a five-year statute of limitations; this means that any violations committed during the current administration could be prosecuted under President Trump’s successor beginning in January 2029. DOJ priorities also could shift during the Trump administration itself. Any expectation of non-enforcement of the FCPA for violations committed today or during the remainder of the Trump administration must be tempered by this mathematical and statutory reality.
Moreover, it is possible that the most enduring aspect of the FCPA EO will be the opportunity it provides the 93 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the U.S. to open new FCPA matters without DOJ Criminal Division approval and participation. The extent to which any of those offices exploit that opportunity successfully and at scale remains to be seen, but it likely will be difficult for the Criminal Division to reassert its historic level of primacy over DOJ FCPA enforcement in the future, leaving a multitude of prosecutors across the country with little standing in their way when it comes to initiating large-scale corporate anti-corruption investigations.
Enforcement Gaps May Open, but the U.S. Isn’t Going Away
Importantly, the “pause” on FCPA enforcement only affects the DOJ, not the SEC and CFTC which may still bring civil enforcement actions for FCPA violations. Therefore, even if the DOJ retreats from its traditionally aggressive FCPA enforcement, other U.S. authorities may still pursue FCPA investigations.
Equally, it is already clear that the “pause” will not end all existing DOJ FCPA investigations, in which evidence will continue to be developed and (potentially) shared by the DOJ with its overseas counterparts. The FCPA EO also does not shut down any of the plethora of DOJ whistleblower programs announced in recent years (much less SEC or CFTC whistleblower programs), which reportedly already have yielded a significant number of tips.
Additionally, even during the “pause” on criminal FCPA enforcement, the AG is empowered to grant exceptions for new investigations and enforcement actions. No criteria are offered for this purpose, and therefore it remains unclear how readily exceptions will be granted, but the DOJ’s retreat from FCPA enforcement could be less dramatic than immediate reactions to the FCPA EO predicted.
Foreign Enforcers: Filling the Void?
Prior to the FCPA EO, the SFO and other enforcement agencies would have faced familiar challenges of investigation deconfliction with an active DOJ investigating and prosecuting FCPA violations. The enforcement field may now be more readily available to the SFO, the PNF and others, although the presence of multiple agencies will still require some deconfliction.
The UK and France in particular have anti-bribery laws similar to the FCPA, as well as active anti-corruption enforcement agencies in the SFO and PNF that have developed a track record of wide-ranging and largely successful investigations and prosecutions in recent years. Whereas previously these agencies may have refrained from exercising the full scope of their enforcement capabilities in matters the U.S. was also investigating, these (and other) agencies may face far fewer impediments to more aggressive deployment of their tools and exercise of their jurisdiction.
SFO
Wielding the Bribery Act 2010 and, in particular, its failure to prevent bribery offense, the SFO is well-positioned to claim territory that might be ceded by the U.S. The SFO has been a key DOJ partner in many cross-border matters, including high-profile anti-corruption matters such as the Rolls‑Royce, Airbus and Glencore cases. However, cross-border cooperation between the U.S. and the UK has not been without challenges, due to key differences between the jurisdictions on issues such as compelled testimony, privilege, corporate criminal liability, discovery/disclosure and double jeopardy.
Most SFO cases have an international element, according to the SFO’s five-year strategy published in 2024 (Strategy), and since 2014, the SFO has entered into 12 deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), eight of which were linked to bribery. The SFO currently has an active caseload of around 130 cases and is operating with a budget of £95.5 million and a staff count of over 500 people, the Strategy says. Its budget was increased by the UK government in November 2024 to enable modernization to take place.
SFO Director Nick Ephgrave KPM has expressed a desire to adopt a bold, pragmatic and proactive approach to enforcement, and also to pursue large, international corruption cases, including in partnership with the SFO’s international counterparts. Under his leadership, the SFO reportedly has launched several new investigations, arrested 15 individuals and revived the use of dawn raids, according to its annual report. In January 2025, it obtained its first Unexplained Wealth Order, and, in 2023, it pursued its first prosecution of a breach of a Serious Crime Prevention Order. It also has commenced proceedings against Güralp Systems for the company’s breach of its 2019 DPA, and, just last month, the SFO announced charges against a UK reinsurance broker alleged to have paid millions of dollars in bribes to Ecuadorean officials in exchange for contracts, as well as new guidance on corporate cooperation that signals an appetite for increased corporate criminal enforcement in the bribery context and beyond.
One area in particular Ephgrave is looking to develop is the treatment of whistleblowers. Departing from the view that rewarding whistleblowers is incompatible with British legal culture, Ephgrave has stated that whistleblowers should be compensated in order to enhance efficiencies in SFO investigations. Naturally, the proposals for any new UK whistleblower scheme would be subject to a consultation process with a cross section of the legal profession, which would take time – certainly beyond the 180 (or 360) days of the “pause” on DOJ activity. But looking to the future in light of the (unpredictable) new policies and guidelines to be introduced by the U.S. AG, a new UK whistleblowing scheme – if introduced – could prove to be effective in increasing the UK’s prosecution of international bribery.
A key question will be whether the SFO is sufficiently resourced and committed to fill any enforcement gap that the FCPA EO might create. The SFO has been criticized in the past for being slow-moving and having a lower rate of conviction or other successful outcome than the DOJ. Taking on a heavier workload would put sizeable demands on the SFO’s resources, which are more limited than the DOJ’s, and technological resources and disclosure will present further complications, with disclosure failures having led to collapses of prosecutions of individuals in the Unaoil, G4S and Serco cases.
Nevertheless, the entrepreneurialism and initiative demonstrated by the SFO in co‑founding the Taskforce suggest that the agency does not intend to shy away from these challenges, and companies with an actual or potential UK nexus must ensure their anti-corruption compliance programs and internal controls are not lessened in response to the FCPA EO.
See “UK Launches U.S.‑Style Whistleblower Reward Program to Combat Tax Fraud and the SFO May Be Next” (Apr. 23, 2025).
PNF
Over the past decade, the PNF has joined the anti-corruption fight in earnest, and after the FCPA EO’s publication, a PNF prosecutor stated publicly that despite the FCPA EO, “[t]he PNF will keep its watch on foreign bribery.”
The PNF’s key tool is the Law on Transparency, the Fight against Corruption and Modernization of Economic Life (known as Sapin II), which expanded the extraterritorial reach of French anti-corruption laws, laid the foundation for increased penalties and introduced conventions judiciaires d’intérêt public (CJIPs), which are roughly equivalent to DPAs. Sapin II authorizes criminal prosecution for offences committed abroad, not only by a natural person of French nationality, but also by any natural person or legal entity habitually residing or exercising all or part of their economic activity on French territory.
The PNF’s enforcement efforts have been productive in recent years. As of the publication of its 2024 annual report, the PNF had secured 532 convictions (of which 129 related to bribery), recovering €12.3 billion. Overall, it has concluded more than 20 bribery-related CJIPs. In the past two years, ongoing cases have numbered between 766 and 781 annually, with corruption-related offenses accounting for 46.6 percent of cases. The PNF has also played a key role in the development of the guilty plea procedure (comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité), which, in contrast to the CJIP, entails an admission of guilt.
The PNF also has been a key enforcement partner for the U.S. and the UK in recent years, perhaps most prominently in the Airbus case, which resulted in a CJIP. In 2023, the PNF issued guidelines to further align its practice with the sentencing and leniency approaches adopted by the DOJ and SFO, and last year, approximately one-third of its cases required international legal assistance. The PNF also uses advanced international cooperation tools, including Eurojust coordination meetings and joint investigation teams, and has proved itself dependable when it comes to international cooperation.
As with the SFO, it remains to be seen to what extent the PNF – with 20 prosecutors and 11 specialized assistants – will be capable of coping with any increased volume and intensity of cases created by an FCPA enforcement “pause,” but its enthusiastic support for the Taskforce is an important early signal of its commitment to meet the challenge.
See “How the New DOJ and PNF Corporate Enforcement Guidelines Affect Self-Reporting, Cooperation and Remediation” (Mar. 29, 2023).
Switzerland (and Beyond?)
With its participation in the Taskforce, Switzerland has clearly expressed a desire to step up and join the UK and France as the anti-corruption leadership team. In recent years, Switzerland has acted in parallel to the DOJ and others in anti-corruption cases such as the Gunvor, Trafigura and Glencore matters.
Switzerland’s key anti-corruption legislation is found in the Swiss Criminal Code, the relevant parts of which have some extraterritorial reach. Moreover, the Judicial Affairs Committee of the Swiss Parliament is exploring the possibility of introducing DPAs.
Other countries have also stepped up their anti-corruption enforcement efforts. For example, foreign bribery enforcement has increased in the Netherlands, and in Poland, several corruption investigations are ongoing, some of which are proceeding in parallel with foreign law enforcement agencies. Hong Kong and Singapore are also active players, and Australia, South Africa and others have also ramped up their efforts.
What It All Means for Companies
Though not explicitly framed as such by its founding members, the Taskforce surely comes partially in response to early indicia of a DOJ retreat from anti-corruption enforcement and, if implemented robustly, the Taskforce may meaningfully counterbalance any such retreat. Details of implementation, diligent follow-through, and enduring commitment by the founders will determine the extent of the Taskforce’s impact, but, at a minimum, its existence must remind companies that disinvesting from anti-corruption compliance based on the FCPA EO would be a mistake.
Companies (and individuals) are currently facing something very new: a non‑U.S.‑led anti-corruption enforcement landscape. And there is little by way of precedent to guide them, as the U.S.’ FCPA enforcement efforts have long served as a leading indicator and driver of global anti-corruption enforcement. While the Taskforce represents an important effort at cross-border cooperation and coordination, it remains unclear (and perhaps unlikely) that it, much less any single country, is prepared to fill the U.S.’ outsized role in that regard. Rather, companies should expect a far more fragmented and uncertain enforcement landscape, and one in which companies may be without the refuge historically provided by the U.S.’ (relatively) transparent and tested enforcement regime.
In addition, no matter how powerful the Taskforce turns out to be, it still will have to contend with a muscular but far more unpredictable U.S. approach to anti-corruption enforcement. How and when the U.S. will seek to exercise its more traditional role of global anti-corruption leader, and whether it will do so in ways that complement or frustrate the efforts of the Taskforce (and others) remain to be seen, multiplying the already significant challenges of multi-jurisdictional deconfliction.
Further counselling against disinvestment from anti-corruption compliance and controls are numerous familiar and longstanding concerns that will remain irrespective of the ultimate impact of the Taskforce and the ongoing role of the U.S. in anti-corruption enforcement. These include the obvious reputational risks arising from allegations of bribery, as well as, among other things: (1) civil litigation or arbitration by private parties (e.g., business partners and shareholders) for, inter alia, securities law violations, breaches of contract, torts and civil RICO violations; (2) antitrust law issues; and (3) issues when dealing with auditors, international organisations – such as development banks – and other parties.
The promise and ambitions of the Taskforce are great, and its potential cannot be overlooked. Companies and their counsel will do well to prepare for continued anti-corruption enforcement, which is likely to look very different from – and proceed less predictably than – what professionals and practitioners in this space have become accustomed to in recent years.
Albert Stieglitz is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Alston & Bird, and a member of the firm’s white collar, government and internal investigations team. A former senior federal prosecutor with 13 years of experience at the DOJ, SFO and (UK) Financial Conduct Authority, he advises companies and individuals on anti-corruption investigations, litigation and compliance issues, as well as securities fraud and other complex and cross-border conduct.
Kelly Hagedorn is a partner in the London office of Alston & Bird, and a member of the firm’s privacy and cyber regulatory enforcement team. She defends clients in regulatory and enforcement matters in the E.U. and UK, and advises clients on incident response and white-collar investigations, litigation, and parliamentary investigations, particularly those involving data breaches, fraud and financial crimes, and securities laws.
Sophia Lekakis is a senior associate in the London office of Alston & Bird and a member of the firm’s international arbitration and dispute resolution team. She advises companies and individuals on complex cross-border disputes in the E.U., UK and other jurisdictions.