As part of what appears to be a sweep of commodities trading firms, the DOJ announced on March 1, 2024, one of its largest settlements in recent years. Swiss-based Gunvor S.A. (Gunvor or the Company) has agreed to pay over $661 million to resolve an investigation into FCPA violations related to its dealings with Ecuador’s state-owned and -controlled oil company, Petroecuador.
The settlement is “significant,” according to Fry Wernick, a partner at Vinson & Elkins and former DOJ prosecutor, both due to size of the resolution and the clear strength of the DOJ investigation. Additionally, this is “among the latest in a string of corruption cases targeting commodities trading firms (Sargeant Marine, Vitol, Glencore, Freepoint, and most recently Trafigura), which DOJ foreshadowed years ago and has come to fruition.”
The company appears to have paid a higher penalty due to its previous anti-corruption issues and its lackluster cooperation, but it still managed to avoid a compliance monitor by engaging in significant remediation. The Anti-Corruption Report spoke with experts in the field to tease out the lessons from the case.
See “SAP’s $220‑Million Settlement Offers Clues on Compliance Expectations” (Feb. 14, 2024).
Bribes to Petroecuador
According to the Statement of Facts attached to the Plea Agreement, to which the Company admitted as part of its settlement, Gunvor, a subsidiary of Gunvor Group Ltd., a multinational energy commodities trading company based in Cyprus, bribed officials in Ecuador in order to obtain or retain business.
The bribery scheme has its roots in a program of oil-backed loans sought by Petroecuador circa 2011. Through the program, Petroecuador obtained loans from other state-owned entities (SOEs) that were secured by oil products to be delivered in the future. Private trading companies – such as Gunvor – then entered into separate, related agreements, called back-to-back contracts, with the SOEs to market, sell and transport the oil products. These side contracts were lucrative and Gunvor was eager to enter into an agreement with an SOE.
Meetings in Miami
To facilitate the deal, Raymond Kohut, who worked in business development at Gunvor, met with Antonio Pere Ycaza (Pere), a consultant based in Miami who had connections to Petroecuador.
“South Florida continues to be the FCPA capital of the world,” James Koukios, a former DOJ prosecutor and current partner at Morrison & Foerster, observed. “So many FCPA cases involve illicit meetings in South Florida, laundering of funds through bank accounts in South Florida, or spending proceeds of FCPA violations in South Florida,” he said. “This case has at least the former two.”
Serving As Intermediary Between Two SOEs
At the meeting in Miami, Kohut and Pere discussed how an SOE based in Asia, referred to in the Statement of Facts only as “State-Owned Entity #1,” could enter into a relationship with Petroecuador.
It is “not the normal fact scenario” for a multinational organization to serve as an intermediary, advocating on behalf of one state-owned entity with another state-owned entity, Wernick observed. “Here, Gunvor served in many ways as the intermediary engaging other sub-intermediaries in the dirty deeds, which makes the conduct particularly egregious.”
“I don’t know of many, if any, cases offhand that involved SOEs on opposite ends of the bribery equation,” Koukios agreed, making it a fairly rare fact pattern. But, setting that aside, “the mechanics of the alleged bribery scheme are not that unusual.”
The case illustrates the importance of having “enhanced diligence processes in place when dealing with state-owned entities, whether on the buy or sell side of a transaction,” Wernick advised.
Additionally, it serves as a reminder that “even SOEs have to engage in anti-corruption-related third-party management,” Koukios said.
Funneling Bribes Through a Third-Party Intermediary
After meeting with Kohut and learning of Gunvor’s willingness, Pere met with Nilsen Arias Sandoval, a senior manager at Petroecuador, and offered to pay bribes on Gunvor’s and State-Owned Entity #1’s behalf. As a result, State-Owned Entity #1 provided loans to Petroecuador in exchange for oil products to be provided over a period of years. Gunvor then entered into a back-to-back contract with State-Owned Entity #1 to market the oil products.
Around the same time, Gunvor’s Singaporean subsidiary entered into a service agreement with Pere and his brother, Enrique Pere Ycaza (Enrique Pere), through a shell company formed in Panama called Energy Intelligence & Consulting Corp. (EIC). This arrangement was solely for the purpose of providing the Pere brothers with funds to pass along to government officials.
Third-party intermediaries such as EIC “continue to be the number one area of FCPA risk,” Koukios said.
“There are often perfectly legitimate reasons for companies to use third parties to help originate business, but third-party risk always presents the biggest risk of corruption, and it is incumbent upon companies to vet third parties carefully and to be especially careful when dealing with third parties in transactions that involve state-owned entities and high corruption-risk jurisdictions,” Wernick agreed.
The use of business origination agents such as the Pere brothers is particularly risky and of questionable utility. “Business origination agents can be called many different things in different industries, but it would be fair to say that DOJ questions the necessity of these types of third parties,” Nat Edmonds, a former DOJ prosecutor and partner at Paul Hastings, told the Anti-Corruption Report. Some companies eliminate these types of relationships and find they are not critical to long-term business success. But it is important to remain aware of the competitive landscape and whether non-U.S. competitors continue to use the business origination agents. “Unequal enforcement on corruption risks can lead to significant business impact for companies subject to U.S. enforcement if their competitors are not facing the same scrutiny,” he said.
See “Fewer Individual Charges and More Focus on Third Parties in 2023’s FCPA Enforcements” (Feb. 28, 2024).
Bribes for Information
In 2015, Gunvor expanded the scheme to involve a second Asian SOE – referred to as State-Owned Entity #2 in the Statement of Facts. Kohut and another Gunvor manager met with Petroecuador’s Arias in Bangkok, Thailand, to obtain information about the status of the contract negotiation process. The bribery scheme continued for years afterwards, with bribes often paid in exchange for confidential information.
“Historically, companies have bribed for access to confidential information about the scope and timing of contracts and tenders,” which can impact whether a contract is obtained or the contract’s terms, Edmonds explained. The FCPA is drafted to encompass bribing for any type of “business advantage,” which is defined broadly and includes this type of information.
While Gunvor used illegal means here, there are legitimate ways to obtain business-critical information. For example, “public tenders frequently allow for companies to request information to help with the bids,” Wernick noted, “but that information must be provided to all bidders to ensure a level playing field in the bid process.”
Additionally, “companies routinely work with local firms to get that type of information, which often can be observed through on-the-ground personnel or other general intelligence gathering,” according to Edmonds. “However, companies need to be careful that their local partners are not engaging in bribery to get that type of critical market intelligence.”
See “Understanding and Mitigating Risk of Organizational Conflicts of Interest for Government Vendors” (Mar. 13, 2024).
Compliance Failures
By 2018, Gunvor executives and compliance personnel knew that millions of dollars had been paid to the Pere brothers and their shell companies. Between 2018 and 2020, Gunvor personnel attempted to meet with the brothers and obtain supporting documentation. The brothers would not accommodate these requests, yet Gunvor continued to make corrupt payments to the shell companies until 2020.
“If there are concerns or gaps in documentation, companies should consider pausing payments to third parties while the outstanding documentation is gathered,” Edmonds advised. This demonstrates to enforcers that compliance is working in practice and also ensures potential misconduct is not compounded. Likewise, pausing payments helps provide “motivation for the third party to meet its contractual obligations and provide the company with the required documentation,” he added.
The brothers’ refusal to respond to requests for documentation was itself a red flag “which also could have provided a basis for stopping payments, as well as potentially for conducting an internal investigation,” Koukios said.
The Company’s failure to stop payments appears to have been a large reason why it did not receive full cooperation credit off the low-end of the Sentencing Guidelines, “which meant a penalty that was tens of millions of dollars higher than it needed to be,” Wernick said. “The Company should have acted swiftly and aggressively against the brothers’ companies and shut down further payments, especially since this also occurred at the same time that Gunvor was entering into a separate corruption resolution with Swiss authorities,” he opined. “DOJ did not look kindly upon these facts as they showed a lack of commitment to compliance and remediation by the company.”
See “Noticing Red Flags, Cultivating Company Culture Key to Compliance” (May 24, 2023).
The DOJ Builds a Strong Case
On March 1, 2024, Gunvor entered into a plea agreement with the DOJ, admitting that it had engaged in a multi-year scheme to pay money to an intermediary it knew would be used in part to bribe government officials, and it profited in an amount of more than $384 million. As a result, the Company agreed to pay $374,560,071 as a criminal monetary penalty and forfeiture in the amount of $287,138,444.
No Voluntary Disclosure, but Some Cooperation Credit
The Plea Agreement notes that the Company did not receive credit for voluntary disclosure but did receive credit for cooperating with the government’s investigation. That cooperation included providing information from its own internal investigation, making factual presentations, producing documents “while navigating foreign data privacy and criminal laws,” and translating documents.
Additionally, the Plea Agreement gives the Company credit for “imaging the phones of relevant custodians at the beginning of the Defendant’s internal investigation, thus preserving business communications sent on mobile messaging applications” for when the DOJ came knocking. “BYOD policies and local laws and regulations can make collecting phones extremely difficult, and sometimes effectively impossible,” Koukios explained, so “DOJ does seem intent on providing cooperation credit to companies who are successful in doing so.”
When it comes to providing access to witnesses, the Company’s cooperation was perhaps a little less impressive. The Plea Agreement notes that the Company arranged for the interview of a single employee based outside the U.S. “This, combined with the lack of voluntary disclosure credit and extensive use of mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) evidence, suggests that DOJ conducted significant investigation outside of the company’s cooperation and awareness,” Edmonds suggested.
Indeed, the DOJ’s press release announcing the settlement says that “valuable assistance” was provided by the authorities in the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Portugal, Singapore and Switzerland, which shows “the DOJ’s extensive coordination with global authorities,” according to Koukios.
Gunvor’s lack of voluntary disclosure probably increased the size of the financial penalties, Edmonds posited. Despite the Company’s failure to disclose, the DOJ was able to obtain information from “cooperating witnesses involved in the underlying misconduct as well as detailed financial tracing that likely included mutual legal assistance treaty requests for evidence held in multiple locations around the world,” he added, cautioning companies to be cognizant that “attempts to limit or control the spread of information are increasingly challenging in a global environment.”
See “How Companies Can Respond to the Boom in FCPA Enforcement Fueled by International Cooperation” (Oct. 30, 2019).
Credit for Remediation
The Company also received credit for taking remedial measures, many of which reflect recent DOJ priorities, such as “evaluating and updating its compensation policy to better incentivize compliance,” “implementing a risk-based communications policy that addresses the use of ephemeral and encrypted messaging applications,” and “conducting compliance culture reviews.”
Notably, the Company also eliminated the use of third-party business origination agents, a fairly significant but not unprecedented move. “DOJ has long credited companies for eliminating the use of third parties,” Koukios said, citing the recent Albemarle and SAP resolutions as examples. Whether this change will be detrimental to Gunvor’s business remains to be seen, though. “On the one hand, the use of such agents can be completely legitimate and beneficial, especially when a company is entering into a new market or a new line of business and has no prior connections,” Koukios explained. “On the other hand, such agents can outlive their usefulness, in which case eliminating them can be beneficial, both in terms of not paying unnecessary fees and in reducing FCPA risk.”
Gunvor did not only make changes, but, critically, it also pressure tested those improvements to determine whether they were effective. The Plea Agreement specifically notes that the Company tested the effectiveness of its hotline, new third-party due diligence process and payment controls. “What really strikes me is that this resolution again demonstrates that the best way for a company to avoid an independent compliance monitor is to implement remediation early so that it has time to demonstrate the effectiveness of those remedial steps through testing,” Koukios said.
See “Albemarle Resolutions Bring First Application of DOJ’s Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks Pilot Program” (Nov. 8, 2023); and “SAP’s $220‑Million Settlement Offers Clues on Compliance Expectations” (Feb. 14, 2024).
A Demerit for a History of Misconduct
While Gunvor received credit for its cooperation and remediation, the DOJ also considered its history of misconduct when coming to a resolution. The Company reached a resolution with Swiss authorities in 2019 based on a corrupt scheme to bribe officials in Congo-Brazzaville and Côte d’Ivoire to obtain oil contracts that occurred at the same time as the conduct involved here.
In October 2021, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced that the DOJ would consider both domestic and foreign criminal, civil and regulatory misconduct when making charging decisions. “In an increasingly global enforcement world, U.S. enforcement authorities will consistently take into account enforcement by other authorities,” Edmonds observed, because U.S. authorities do not want companies gaming the international enforcement system and attempting to minimize finds by resolving different matters in different jurisdictions.
In October 2022, Monaco clarified that not all instances of prior misconduct are equally relevant or probative and that, “[i]n general, prosecutors weighing these factors should assign the greatest significance to recent U.S. criminal resolutions, and to prior misconduct involving the same personnel or management.” That stance begs the question of how much weight was given to the Swiss settlement. The deciding factor may have been that the conduct at issue in the Swiss settlement occurred at the same time as Gunvor was also bribing Ecuadorian authorities. “DOJ has long considered temporally overlapping misconduct as not being evidence of true recidivism, even if the misconduct was discovered at different times (because recidivism reflects a reversion to criminal conduct after sanction),” Koukios said.
“While a company’s history of criminal misconduct in the U.S. should be more significant than a resolution in another country, the fact that a company has a history of similar misconduct elsewhere cannot be ignored,” Wernick agreed. “It no doubt was one reason why DOJ did not see fit to provide full cooperation credit against the low-end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.”
See “Compliance Lessons From SEC’s $62.2‑Million Settlement With Recidivist Philips for FCPA Violations” (Jun. 7, 2023).
A Big Settlement
All in, Gunvor will pay more than $661 million to resolve the allegations in this case – one of the largest FCPA settlements in the past three years.
Numbers Have Been Down
Corporate fines hit an all-time high in 2020 and then plummeted in the past three years. “COVID had a real impact on FCPA enforcement, as law enforcement was unable to engage in the same face-to-face meetings and investigative tactics that are critical to developing big cases,” Wernick explained. “DOJ also brought a number of individual cases that have resulted in trials being conducted, which takes up enormous prosecutorial resources and has had an apparent impact on the development of corporate cases leading to large resolutions.”
But whether this case represents a shift back to the pre-2020 days remains to be seen. “I don’t believe that you can draw any conclusions from this type of data set,” Koukios said. “Some cases will be big or small, depending on the scope of the underlying misconduct.”
Forfeiture Inflates the Numbers
In this case, the settlement numbers were driven up by Gunvor’s forfeiture of profits related to its illegal conduct.
“A recent trend that has been particularly notable to me, and what almost doubled the total monetary impact here, was DOJ’s insistence that non-issuers not only pay a criminal monetary penalty but also forfeit allegedly illicit profits,” Koukios said, noting that when issuers are involved, SEC disgorgement typically serves the same role. “Forfeiture added an extra $287 million here,” he noted, nearly doubling the criminal monetary penalty.
The forfeiture penalty could have unintended consequences when it comes to voluntary self-disclosure, Koukios warned. “Although I understand DOJ’s theory for requiring forfeiture, I do wonder what the impact will be on self-reporting by non-issuers, as the forfeiture amount would more than cancel out any potential benefit from self-reporting in many cases.”
Additionally, forfeitures just might not be a good look for DOJ. Edmonds noted that the DOJ gets to keep the forfeitures, whereas criminal penalties go directly to the U.S. general treasury fund. Unfortunately, the monetary benefit enforcement authorities realize from sizable forfeiture amounts or credit (“stats”) they may receive can lead to criticism of overly aggressive prosecution and inflated penalties, he said. “DOJ should be extremely careful that it does not lose further credibility regarding the independence of its prosecution by overplaying the role of forfeiture on these large corporate enforcement actions.”
See “FCPA Enforcement, Changes in 2023 Foretell a Busy Year Ahead” (Jan. 17, 2024).
